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CRIME OR DISEASE? by ANTONY FLEW. Scranton, Pa.: Barnes &
Noble. Bibliography; index; notes. 1973. Pp. xii+129. $6.50 cloth.
Rodney J. Blackman*
Professor Antony Flew, a well-respected British philosopher writing in
Canada, has put forth a short work dealing with the relationship between
crime and mental disease. The book is illuminating and provocative. It
is also theoretical in nature and sometimes diffuse and difficult in style.
Thus, while the work is intended to have a wider audience, it probably
would appeal most to the philosophically trained or to the motivated psychologist, psychoanalyst or penologist.
The primary question posed by Flew is whether all crimes can be characterized accurately as having been committed by mentally diseased persons. The proferred answer is a short no. The alternative view would
allow states to treat any socially disapproved behavior (here called disfavored behavior) which is made into a crime as a manifestation of a mental disease, and to act accordingly. One absurd possible consequence of
putting this alternative view into practice would be that a person who violated the U.S. Civil Rights Act of 1964 could cure himself of this manifested 'mental disease' simply by moving to South Africa where his similar acts would not violate the law. Further, this view could be used to
justify the treatment of political dissidents or of those engaging in disfavored life styles by potentially harmful means, such as electro-convulsive
therapy or drugs such as aminazin. 1 Also, if each convicted criminal
were put into the hands of a psychiatrist for "cure," -and no "cure" were
effected, then the incarceration logically could be indefinite in duration.
This is -because if the only criterion for terminating the confinement were
the criminal's "cure," then there could be no appeal to the notion of justice or fairness as requiring that the period of confinement not go on in-2
definitely but rather should bear a reasonable relationship to the crime.
Finally, because this treatment leaves the person with no choice, "direct
and unrequested physiological manipulation, however well-intentioned,
however humane its methods, must be. . . an outrage against the -freedom
and dignity of 'responsible and autonomous man'" whereas "'to be punished, however severely, because we have deserved it, because we "ought
to have known better," is to be treated as a human person. ..
"
Flew would preclude these untoward consequences by denying that all
criminal acts manifest mental illness. He does this through an analysis of
* Assistant Professor of Law, DePaul College of Law. B.A., University of
Michigan; M.A., University of Chicago; J.D., Harvard Law School. Ph.D. (cand.),

University of Wisconsin.
1. A. FLEW, CRIME OR DISEASE?, 84, 89 (1973).,
2. Id. at 83, 111.
3. Id. at 86, quoting B.F. SKINNER, BEYOND FREEDOM AND DIGNITY 19 (1971)
and C.S. LEWIs, UNDECEPTIONS 242-43 (1972).
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,the term 'mental illness' which he determines has a limited application
that does not include ordinary criminal conduct. Mental illnesses can be
subdivided into two groupings, namely, those illnesses clearly associated
with identifiable cerebral abnormalities (organic) and those illnesses not
,(or not yet) so associated (functional). Flew is relatively sympathetic
with Freud's analysis of obsessional neurosis and seemingly also with
hysteria as core or paradigm examples of functional mental illness. 4 And
Flew disagrees with what he regards as Dr. Szasz's view that there are only
organic illnesses.6 While the term 'mental illness' ,(or 'mental disease')
does have functional application, it does not apply to all those who engage in criminal acts. Coming by way of analogy from Flew's analysis
of what constitutes physical disease, 'mental illness' is to be defined by
contrast with an inclination toward disfavored behavior. One is not men,tally ill simply because he or she engages in disfavored behavior, but only
if he or she is unable to inhibit his or her inclination toward this behavior.
Thus, mental illness or disease is to be defined in terms of capacities and
incapacities (inabilities to inhibit inclinations toward disfavored behavior)
rather than in terms of the disfavored behavior itself. 6 While Flew does
not spell out clearly what incapacities are relevant to his definition,
he does refer to "afflictions which reduce the rational capacities of the
patient" as well as (other) "acquired incapacities [which] are the expressions of unconscious motives." ' 7 As part of this requirement (or perhaps as an additional requirement) the criminal act which manifests disease is to be compulsive, that is, "(more or less) uncontrollable." '8 The
other requirement (which Flew admits can be doubted) is that the diseased condition should be regarded by the patient as bad. The patient
with this condition would find himself a victim of the condition rather
than a (totally free) agent. 9 Of course, Flew is not asserting that what
is not mental illness could not be treated as if it were mental illness.
Flew's analysis would not prevent the state from turning over mentally
healthy prisoners to psychiatrists for treatment on the ground that even
healthy prisoners could "benefit" from treatment and thereby become
trained not to engage in the disfavored behavior. But if such treatment
were offered in lieu of punishment, it probably would reduce the deterrent effect on others which the current system of punishment now provides.
This analysis obviously only hints at the richness of Professor Flew's
thought. And it hardly suggests his extensive use of, and often penetrating commentary on, much of the literature. But -this summary does focus
4. Id. at 58-63; S. FREUD, INTRODUCTORY LECTURES ON PSYCHOANALYSIS 219-20
(1922).
5. A. FLEW, supra note 1, at 65-66; T. SZASZ, THE MYTH OF MENTAL ILLNESS
(1961). Flew argues against Dr. Szasz by pointing out that it would be awkward
to deal with what had been considered functional but which further evidence shows
to be organic.
6. FLEW, supra note 1, at 50, 65-66.

7. Id. at 64.
8.
9.

Id. at 66.
Id. at 17, 54-55.
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on what appears to be the primary motivation for much of this book,
namely, Flew's humanism and his resulting abhorrence of the way prisoners can be and are treated when regarded as mentally ill, particularly
when they are turned over to psychiatrists for unrequested physical manipulation. The reviewer shares this attitude.
But there are some questions and possible criticisms worth discussing.
Several criticisms can be leveled at the publisher. One is that the book
contains several typographical errors. Also, while the book contains an
index of names, a standard index including topics and ideas would also
prove helpful. A relatively minor criticism of Flew is that he appears to
use the terms 'mental illness', 'mental disease' and 'mental deficiency' more
or less interchangeably without so indicating. (The first two terms will
be used interchangeably here.)10
Turning to more substantive issues, questions can be raised about, and
arguments presented against, Flew's stated requirements for mental illness: the person's incapacity and compulsion, and his regarding the condition as bad. Flew develops these requirements, not only because he regards them as genuinely applicable, but also because he -regards them as
needed to eliminate the misuse of the term 'mental illness'. But a number
of simple, common bad habits could meet these requirements: heavy cigarette smoking, heavy drinking," gum chewing, nail biting and overeating.
Still, not everyone would agree '(particularly some of those who have these
habits) that such habits are manifestations of mental illness. Thus, it can
be argued that even Flew's limiting requirements for mental illness allow
for the inclusion of questionable items, including socially disapproved habits. While the possible inclusion of bad habits within Flew's requirements
is not a very telling argument against the positing of ,them, it does indicate
that these requirements are not as limiting as Flew seems to have supposed.
Dealing with Flew's specific requirements, the problem with requiring
that the person himself regard the condition as bad is that it is false in
10.

'Defect' indicates a lack or absence of something.

'Disease' and 'illness',

which THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY classifies as synonymous with "disease")
indicates an abnormal condition. Where 'defect' and 'disease' appear to differ in
meaning is that in 'defect' the focus is on a comparison of the individual with a
general human norm, whereas in 'disease' the focus is on a comparison of the current
state of the individual with a healthy state of the same individual. If the condition

is organic from birth, and apparently untreatable, then the more useful reference is
to 'mental defect.'

For example, a Mongoloid idiot ordinarily would be referred

to as mentally defective rather than mentally diseased.

While otherwise generally

synonymous, 'mental illness' differs from 'mental disease' in that it can be used
to refer to a functional (non-organic) condition, whereas 'mental disease' seems to
imply an organic disorder. See J.C. CHAPLIN, DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOLOGY 124, 139
(1968). (To be strictly consistent with the above analysis, this review should use
'mental disease' only when referring to organic illness. But because Flew did not
so restrict its use but apparently used 'mental disease' and 'mental illness' interchangeably, it is easier to follow his lead.)
11. Flew recognizes a more extreme form of this habit-alcoholism-as a mental
illness.
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many instances. The happy person for whom no organic illness has been
found who regards himself as Jesus Christ or Napoleon appears sick to
most of us and is not rendered less sick by virtue of being pleased with his
station in life. Nor does the autistic person for whom no organic illness
has been found appear the less sick when his condition precludes his voicing any unhappiness with his condition. 1 2 Nor does the hypochondriac
appear any less sick because the only illness he will recognize is his imaginary cancer. It seems that in terms of our ordinary, everyday understanding there are13 so many falsifying instances that the requirement ceases
to be applicable.
One can ask why Flew introduces as a requirement for mental illness
something which seems so clearly false. One answer would focus on his
motivation-his -intense dislike of a doctor's performing physical manipulation on an unwilling patient. If the patient's view of his condition as bad
is made a requirement for regarding his condition as a manifestation of
mental illness, then it becomes less likely that a doctor could justify manipulating an unwilling patient on the ground that he was curing mental
illness. Of course, assuming that this laudable motivation induced Flew
to set up this requirement, this does not make the requirement correct.
Another answer would focus on Flew's analogizing from physical illness
to mental illness. Since a person who is physically ill ordinarily recognizes that his condition is bad, the same should hold for mental illness.
Of course, Flew himself is aware that not everyone who is physically ill
recognizes that his condition is bad. To illustrate: the illness may not
yet be at a stage when the person is in discomfort and as a result, if confronted with the doctor's diagnosis, he may refuse to accept it; or the person may be a Christian Scientist who does not accept -the existence of physical illness.
But one may push further and ask whether the analogy is sufficiently
helpful to be employed at all. Flew would justify its use by asserting that
14
the -term 'mental disease' is derivative from the term 'physical disease'.
Though this may be true, one term may be derived from another without
having the same range of use. To assert that 'physical disease' is prior
and 'mental disease' is derived from it does not by itself justify using the
analogy. Contrary to Flew's understanding of the proper range of the use
of the term 'mental illness', this term has a broader range of application
than 'physical illness'. Thus, rather than describing how the terms 'mental illness' or 'mental disease' are used, he is prescribing how these terms
ought to be used. Flew would prefer that the term 'mental illness' not
be used to refer to disfavored behavior which the actor does not regard
12.

See B. BETrELHEIM, TRUANTS FROM LIFE 495 (1955).

13. In fairness to Flew, it ought to be noted that he admits that this second requirement also could be regarded as the usual contingent fact of mental illness rather than a necessary condition of such illness. He states that he sets up
this requirement to point out the difference between a doctor's treating a patient who

wants treatment and the doctor's treatment of a patient who does not want treatment.
FLEW, supra note 1, at 55.
14.

Id. at 26.
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as bad, such as, (sometimes) juvenile delinquency and homosexuality.
But some people do on occasion use the term 'mental illness' to refer to
such behavior. It might be better (in the sense of preferable or even
more correct) if they did not do so. But it begs the question to assert that
this term is misused because its use does not satisfy a requirement borrowed by analogy from the realm of physical illness without an articulated rational justification for the adoption of this analogy. Since Flew
seeks to tighten the looseness of language by limiting the use of 'mental
illness' to situations analogous to those where 'physical illness' is used,
it is up to him to show that physical and mental illnesses are relevantly
similar so that what is required of one reasonably ought to be required of
the other. He does not do this.
Turning to an examination of Flew's first requirement, the assertion is
made that in order for a person to be mentally ill he must be incapable
of inhibiting an inclination toward disfavored behavior rather than simply
manifesting this behavior. A behaviorist could object that a "lack of capacity" has no meaning other than a reference to certain manifested behavior, that is, what really is being asserted about a person who lacks
capacity is that his previous behavioral manifestations, including any verbal utterances, indicate that he will follow a certain pattern in the future.
From the point of view of the behaviorist, the dichotomy between behavior
and capacity is a false one.
Still, as Flew points out (though not in response to the above argument),
his emphasis on lack of capacity is consistent with the law's treatment or
the criminally insane under the M'Naghten Rule, the Model Penal Code
and the Durham Rule. 1 5 The Model Penal Code, quoted by Flew, states
that:
A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct, as a result of mental disease or defect, he lacks substantial capacity
either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct
6
to the requirements of the law.'

Despite this support for Flew's emphasis on capacity rather than simply
focusing on behavior, there remain some problems. One of these is that
Flew seems to weaken his position by coupling it with an assertion that a
person who is mentally ill is under a compulsion. Describing a person as
compulsive seems more like characterizing his behavior than characterizing some lack of capacity.
Other problems flow from Flew's belief that his incapacity requirement
precludes the labeling which can result when mental illness is based solely
on disfavored behavior. As Flew views his requirement, homosexuality
would not be regarded as a manifestation of mental illness:
There is surely, at least typically, no incapacity by which the deviant can
be distinguished from the straight ....
[Elven the exclusive homosexual
is presumably as able, albeit as disinclined, to engage in heterosexual
15. Id. at 51-53.
16. Id.at 53.
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intercourse as the comparably exclusive heterosexual is able, yet not
willing, to undertake any homosexual endeavor.'

7

There are problems with this assertion. Accepting arguendo Flew's requirement of lack of capacity, it seems unlikely that the exclusively homosexual person is as able ,to engage in heterosexual conduct as homosexual
conduct. But even assuming arguendo that the exclusively homosexual
person is just as able though disinclined to engage in heterosexual conduct,
it seems likely that he gets more pleasure out of his homosexual conduct
-than out of heterosexual conduct or else he would pursue heterosexuality.
But the ability to obtain greater pleasure from homosexual encounters than
heterosexual ones can be regarded as a lack of capacity to obtain equivalent pleasure from heterosexual encounters. ,It follows that homosexuals
generally have greater capacity to obtain pleasure from their homosexual
activities. To use Flew's terminology, practicing homosexuals cannot inhibit their inclination toward seeking the greater pleasure of engaging in
the disfavored behavior. Thus, contrary to Flew's hope, it can be argued
of
that homosexuals lack capacity. If so,
18 homosexuals would meet one
Flew's requirements for mental illness.
Flew also mentions as a requirement for mental illness that the person
act compulsively. 19 He asserts that "we have to ask whether the resulting
homosexual desires are peculiarly irresistible."' 20 Only if this is so and if
the other requirements are met (the person lacks capacity and regards
his condition as bad) would the homosexual be regarded as ill under
Flew's schema. Flew finds that ordinarily the homosexual does not act
compulsively. It is interesting to compare Flew's shift in emphasis from
his relatively relaxed understanding of compulsion in the abstract ("(more
or less) uncontrollable," "(unusually hard or) impossible") 21 with his
more demanding understanding of compulsion in the concrete of homosexual expression ("peculiarly irresistible"). This change of emphasis
suggests that Flew is not so much engaging in a disinterested exercise as
developing distinctions for the purpose of producing a desired end, namely,
reducing the adverse effect of labeling homosexuals as ill. But such an
effort, however humane, does not always produce the most persuasive
philosophy.
Indeed, Flew's thesis that homosexuality seldom involves compulsion
can be questioned. If compulsion means that which is "uncontrollable"
or "irresistible" and if homosexuality is defined most broadly as "sexual
17. Id. at 69.
18. Flew himself seems to hedge somewhat in several places. He suggests the
possibility of homosexuality as a lack of capacity when he refers to it on page six
as an "[expression] of personality failure."

And he also implies a possible lack of

capacity by asserting that "as a character trait, homosexuality is not under the immediate control of the subject." Id. at 70.
19. It is not clear whether Flew means this as a part of the requirement of lack
of capacity or as a separate requirement.
20. Id. at 70. Presumably, Flew means this as a part of the requirement of lack
of capacity or as a separate requirement.
21. Id. at 66.
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attraction towards individuals of the same sex" 22 or "sexual feelings for' '2 a
person of the same sex, with an impulse towards genital expression,
then a person who has predominately homosexual fantasies could be regarded as homosexual. Thus, under these definitions, in order for one
who previously engaged in exclusively homosexual activity to avoid being categorized as compulsively homosexual, he would have to be able
to give up not only the behavior but also the thoughts. But sexual
thoughts are difficult to give up.
Even if homosexuality is defined in ,terms of practice rather than
thoughts, attraction or feeling, a person may find himself under a compulsion to engage. Gandhi, for example, is supposed to have stated that
he always wanted to practice (hetero)sexual abstinence but could not
manage it until he was 65.24 And we have it on the authority of Saint
Paul that "one may burn with vain desire" 25 if he is not able to obtain sex.
While Flew feels that a person is not compelled to have sex because he
can choose to abstain, for many people abstinence is not really a choice
in any meaningful sense.
From this analysis it would follow that many homosexuals could be
labeled compulsive. But if this is so, then many homosexuals could be
labeled as mentally ill: the exclusively homosexual person could be regarded as fitting within the requirement of lack of capacity, and the requirement that the person must regard his condition as bad has been
shown above to be inapplicable. Thus, dealing with Flew's own requirements, the label 'mentally ill' could be applied to many homosexuals. 26
But this is precisely the lind of conclusion that Flew sought to avoid. Another conclusion that would follow from these remarks is that heterosexual
conduct would escape being regarded as a manifestation of mental illness
only because it is not disfavored behavior. If the requirement that the
person must regard his condition as bad is eliminated as inapplicable,
then, except for the fact that heterosexual conduct is socially approved,
the heterosexual is roughly in the same position as the homosexual. The
heterosexual would lack the capacity to engage in or enjoy homosexual
acts as much as he does his heterosexual acts. Further, the heterosexual
would be regarded as compulsive in the same way as 'the homosexual
is regarded. Thus, while ,the homosexual can 'be considered mentally ill,
the heterosexual avoids this characterization only because what he does is
socially approved. But this kind of value judgment based solely on the
relative social approval or disapproval of the conduct involved is pre22.
23.

J.

DREVER, A DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOLOGY 122 (1952).
THE AMERICAN COLLEGE DIcMrONARY (1958).

24. Unfortunately, the reviewer cannot now find the source of this quotation. But
he has found a report related by Erik Erikson that at the age of 77-78 Gandhi
slept with naked women stating that his purpose was to test his ability not to become aroused. Unfortunately, for reasons stated in his book, Erikson did not take
Gandhi's statement as an accurate reflection of what he was doing. E. EuKON,
GANDHI'S TRuTH 404 (1969).

25. Corinthians 1:8-9.
26. Flew reluctantly accepts this possibility for some homosexuals. FLEW, supra
note 1, at 70.
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cisely what Flew sought to avoid. Again, the possibility of reaching conclusions that Flew presumably would reject suggests a certain weakness
in his schema.
Flew also can be questioned about his narrow view of the meaning and
-use of the term 'mental illness'. At times he appears to assimilate the
notion of mental illness to the law's narrower definition of insanity. Al-though Flew undoubtedly is aware that the notion of criminal insanity is
narrower than the notion of mental illness, 27 he sometimes gives the appearance of treating :them as coextensive in applicability.
Another indication of the narrowness of Flew's conception of insanity
is his treatment of irrationality (or what he calls a defect of reason).
For Flew deviancy in wants from ordinary wants does not show mental
illness.2 8 Also, mad imprudence is not sufficient to manifest mental illness, for if so, then a political dissident fighting against odds or an altruist
could be characterized as 11.29 What apparently would show mental illness is that the person have beliefs which are without foundation, and
which can 'be decisively disconfirmed.8 0 Flew admits that -he had set up
criteria which would include "only peculiarly flagrant kinds" of cases. 81
He asserts that he does this because the implications of characterizing
someone as mentally ill are serious. But the effect of this narrow basis
for finding irrationality indicative of mental illness is that rather shocking
examples can be given which under this schema do not indicate any mental
illness. Flew gives us several of these examples which he finds not at
all troubling. One such example is that of a James Cooper who went to
the apartment of his former fianc6e. Before ringing the bell, he released
the safety catch of his automatic. When the lady came to the door, he
shot her nine times. He 'then immediately gave himself up to the police.
When questioned about his intent, he said: "'I fired to blow her fucking
head off. How many times do you want me to tell you.'" At the trial
Cooper refused to plead insanity and asserted: "'It is my opinion that
any decision other than guilty, guilty of murder in the first degree, with
no recommendation for leniency, is a miscarriage of justice.' " Although
the jury agreed and the judge passed sentence of electrocution, there was
sufficient psychiatric opinion to the contrary so that on appeal his sentence
was commuted to life imprisonment. Cooper then hung himself.8 2 Flew
finds no mental illness here, no indication of lack of capacity or sufficient
irrationality. So far as Cooper's beliefs are relevant, the beliefs appear
rational enough. Certainly, Cooper's belief that if he shot his former
'financ6e a sufficient number of 'times she would die was not without foundation. Nor was it subject 'to any disconfirmation.
But what Flew refused to regard as relevant and what is troubling about
this example is that Cooper's conduct appears to the neutral outside ob27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at 93.
Id. at 92-93.
Id. at 9-10, 93.
Id. at 94.
Id.
Id. at 90-91.
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server as irrationally related to any understandable non-self-destructive
wants or goals that Cooper might have had. Certainly, Cooper appeared
to be in touch with reality and not suffering from any delusions. But a
person may be mentally ill, though less severely so, even if he is in touch
with reality. From an everyday understanding it appears that a person
whose acts are irrational in relation to any understandable non-self-destructive wants or goals is somewhat mentally ill. And such irrational
conduct can be distinguished from the other kinds of examples that Flew
seeks to protect from the charge of mental illness, particularly, political
dissidence, altruism and socially disapproved behavior, such as homosexuality, which causes no (substantial) harm to others. This disapproved
behavior is here sometimes called self-regarding disfavored behavior.
The political dissident may be madly imprudent by conventional standards because it is very unlikely that he or she will effect any revolutionary changes. But under the test suggested here this would not indicate
that the dissident manifests mental illness so long as he or she is in touch
with reality and, given 'the alternatives, 'his or her behavior is not an irrational means to his or her goal. Further, as a pragmatic matter all
labeling of political dissidents as mentally ill by those in control of the political structure should be suspect automatically as an attempt to discredit
their goals, causes, etc. Similarly, the altruist may be imprudent by conventional standards, but is not manifesting mental illness if he or she is in
touch with reality and, -accepting his or her desire as a given, his or her
act is not irrationally related to it. Also, although different experts have
reached different conclusions, 3 the same position can be taken with respect to such self-regarding disfavored behavior as homosexuality. Assuming that the homosexual is not otherwise manifesting mental illness
and accepting his or her homosexual desires as a given, if 'his or her behavior is not irrationally related to his or her desires then he or she would
not be characterized as mentally ill. But an unwillingness to apply the
label 'mentally ill' to such behavior which the person cannot easily change
also can be justified even if it meets some test of mental illness. This justification rests on a balancing of interests, namely, the value of such labeling is outweighed by the harm caused the person by a pejorative reference to a condition which he or s'he cannot easily change.
But where the person's behavior would harm others and is narrowly
self-centered in motivation rather than the result of genuine political, ideological, cultural or other non-self-centered motivation, then there is no good
reason not to examine the behavior carefully to determine whether it manifests mental illness. If it can be posited that the human organism seeks
to maintain and fulfill itself, then, contrary to Flew's analysis, 'the irrational
pursuit of self-destructive -wants by a physically healthy person, which pursuit serves no other purpose, seems to indicate mental imbalance. A
crime syndicate figure who eliminates a rival without fear of any sanction
would not be mentally ill under this test, nor would the terminally ill
person who kills himself, or the daring sportsman or political activist who
33. See Gould, What We Don't Know About Homosexuality, N.Y. Times, Feb.
24, 1974, § 6 (Magazine), at 12.
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risks death. But a physically healthy person with apparent possibilities
for fulfillment who kills himself or herself only because he or she prefers
death does suggest mental illness by this act. From this it would follow
that the apparently physically healthy person who kills his ex-girl friend,
turns himself over to the police and virtually asks to be killed by the state
prima facie does not appear to be engaging in a rational pursuit of nonself-destructive wants. Flew's narrow concept of mental illness and his
narrow notion of irrationality seem ill-fitted for examples of this nature.
Flew finds his categorization adequate because he seeks to preserve
man as an agent responsible and accountable for his acts. Man has free
will and dignity. Flew asserts that man would have free will in several
relevant senses even if general determinism were shown to be true and
all man's acts were found caused by his heredity or environmental influences. 34 These senses relate to man as a voluntary agent rather -than a
passive recipient. One sense in which man has free will is that at times
he has movings of his limbs rather than only motions. At these times he
has " 'a full sense that he is voluntarily performing -the action' 35 rather
than the action being performed by someone else, say, by a doctor tapping
'the knee to elicit a knee-jerk reflex. Another sense in which free will
is used is in contradistinction to compulsion, where something is done because of a threat from outside. 30 Another way in which free will is used
is to refer to intentional acts rather than unintentional ones.3 7 Under
Flew's view these senses of free will would continue despite a showing that
general determinism was true; even then "there will 'be no call to detheoreticize the meanings of any everyday terms" 38 like free will.
But this does not appear to be so obviously the case as Flew suggests.
Admittedly, even if there is a finding that everything man does is caused
by something else, we still could notice differences that we notice now,
such as, the difference between man as the agent of his actions and the
passive recipient of external forces, between movings and motions, between acts under compulsion and those not, and between intentional and
unintentional behavior. The distinctions may continue but they would
lose their relevance. Under such circumstances, if one were informed
that a person acted without compulsion, a reasonable response would be:
"So what? His behavior still was caused by something else; ,there was
nothing else he as a self-causing agent could 'have done." Unlike the
present situation, where man often views himself or herself emotionally as
a free agent somehow able to stand outside the causal chain of events
and make a difference in what happens, if determinism were shown to be
-true, man would come to an awareness that everything he or she did was
caused by something else (external force, heredity, environment). Man
still would be aware of the difference between an external force causing
his or her acts and heredity as the cause, but the difference would 'be ir34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

FLEW, supra note 1, at 95-103,
Id. at 101.
Id. at 99.
Id. at 103.
Id. at 106.
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relevant with respect to any notion of criminal accountability or responsibility. If man knew that everything he or she did were caused by something, he or she would have no more reason to believe that he or she was
responsible for acts caused by his or her heredity than for acts caused by
someone wielding a gun. The notions 9of criminal responsibility and accountability would become meaningless.a
Even if it cannot be shown that all behavior is caused, if it can be
shown that a criminal's act was somewhat irrational in relation to his nonself-destructive wants, and if treatment might effect a positive change in
him, then there is good reason to treat him rather than simply lock him up.
This would be so even if the prisoner's degree of irrationality is not so
great as to meet the standard of mental illness proposed either by Flew
or by this reviewer. The assumption here is that a person who can learn
to pursue his wants in a non-criminal fashion would be acting more rationally by pursuing these wants non-criminally rather than criminally if
there was any significant chance that his pursuing his wants criminally
would lead to a jail sentence. This is because a jail sentence precludes
-the fulfilling of most wants. But since those already in jail have indicated
some inability to avoid jail, there is some inductive support for the conclusion that if they are freed and engage in criminal acts again, they may
again be unable to avoid jail. From -this it would follow that common
prisoners probably would 'be better off if they could 'be treated and retrained to pursue their wants through non-criminal means. Certainly, society would benefit from a reduction of the recidivism rate if prisoners
could be retrained.
Checks could be built into the structure of the treatment to protect
against the kinds of abuses which Flew notes. One way to do this would
be to restrict treatment to primarily non-physical therapy, such as verbal
psychotherapy, psychoanalysis, group sessions and encounter groups. To
preserve the prisoner's dignity, any therapy on unwilling patients should
be prohibited. Further, because prisoners can be manipulated to accept
permanent physical changes which they otherwise might not accept if they
were not prisoners, any decision to effect physical therapy should require
a determination that the prisoner actually was mentally ill, as well as the
approval of those not involved in the therapy, such as doctors, lawyers,
pastors and those trained in the humanities. Finally, as Flew indicates,
it seems unfair to incarcerate a prisoner indefinitely, regardless of the
seriousness of the crime, just because he or she has been found to be
mentally ill or otherwise irrational and because a psychiatrist has determined that he or she has not responded to treatment. 40 Our notion of
fairness requires that there be some symmetry between the incarceration
39. Flew asserts at several points that such a position would lead to a "categorical
catastrophe." Id. at 77-78, 109. This is true, but is also irrelevant.
40. Flew believes that the notion of justice does not apply when the person is
not found to be a responsible agent, that is, when he is found to be mentally ill. From
this Flew concludes that the notion of justice could not be a check on indefinite incarceration of mentally ill prisoners. But the very fact that Flew is bothered by the
notion of indefinite sentencing for the mentally ill indicates that he regards such sen-
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and the crime. The way to produce this symmetry is to provide a maximum sentence beyond which the prisoner would not 'be detained, regardless of the progress of his or her treatment. Of course, to protect the public, those who commit serious, violent crimes would be given high maximum sentences ranging to life imprisonment.
Flew makes one other argument for a very limited notion of mental
illness as it relates to crime. Flew asserts that "the proper primary purpose of a penal system is: neither retribution on offendors; nor the re4
formation or cure of offenders; but rather the prevention of offences."1"
Flew admits that the high rate of recidivism indicates that the system has
failed to reform. But he seems to believe that the present system, which
is based on the assumption that criminals ordinarily are responsible agents,
has a deterrent effect on others; whereas a penal system that recognized
many criminals as mentally unbalanced in some way or otherwise irrational, and ,treated them accordingly, might not have such a deterrent effect. Flew, quoting from Lady Wootton, asserts: " 'It is futile to uproot
one blade of grass by methods which encourage the proliferation of
others.' "42 But Flew is just conjecturing. He has not shown why this
deterrent effect might diminish. Indeed, the present high crime rate and
high recidivism rate suggest that the present system based on punishment
due to responsibility has failed to deter. A change might be for the better
as well as for the worse. Flew takes the position that people refrain from
crime because they are afraid of getting caught and incarcerated. And
Flew assumes that if people knew that once they got incarcerated after
engaging in a crime they would be treated rather than simply punished,
they would be more likely to engage in crime. Flew's fear seems plausible
only if people would commit crime in order to get treated. But if this were
the case, the appropriate remedy would be to expand public mental health
services. Under the version of -the -proposal that Flew attacks, which is
presented above, people still would be incarcerated after being convicted
of a crime. The only difference between the version of the present system
tencing as unfair. The reviewer shares this attitude, but is not convinced that the
notion of justice is irrelevant here. Unfairness in sentencing seems to be an aspect
of what would constitute injustice. The notion of justice could be regarded as requiring some rough symmetry between the crime and the incarceration, regardless of the

criminal's responsibility.
41.

FLEW,

supra note 1, at 79.

Wittgenstein presents a different and more ac-

ceptable understanding of the notion of punishment. He asserts:
Why do we punish criminals? Is it from a desire for revenge?

Is it in

order to prevent a repetition of the crime? And so on. The truth is that
there is no one reason. There is the institution of punishing criminals. Different people support this for different reasons, and for different reasons

in different cases and at different times. Some people support it out of
a desire for revenge, some perhaps out of a desire for justice, some out of
a wish to prevent a repetition of the crime, and so on. And so punishments
are carried out.

L.

WITrGENSTEIN, LECTURES AND CONVERSATIONS ON EsTHETICs, PSYCHOLOGY AND
RELIGIOUs BELIEF 50 (C. Barrett ed. 1967).

42.

FLEW, supra note 1, at 79.
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that Flew supports and the above proposal is a change of emphasis from
simple incarceration to incarceration plus treatment for mental illness and
other irrational 'behavior. This is not a revolutionary change and already
exists to some degree. And it does not seem likely to reduce the deterrent
effect.
Finally, given Flew's restrictions on the concept of mental illness, it
ought to be pointed out that 'mental illness' is a term with a cluster of
different related uses (what Wittgenstein calls a family resemblance concept)43 rather than a term having a single invariant meaning. A physiologist might use the term to refer only to organic disorders in the brain;
a Freudian psychiatrist would use the term in a less restrictive fashion,
and would include references to functional disorders. And not all psychiatrists agree as to the applicable criteria for mental illness. The current legal definitions differ from the psychiatric definitions. The man on
the street uses the term differently as well.
The acceptance of a wide variety of uses of the term 'mental illness'
leads to the possibility that Flew feared: the term might be used to refer
to disliked, socially unaccepted behavior. The term then becomes (and
has become) a weapon wielded by those who dominate society against
dissidents and the different.
Various ways of limiting this unfortunate possibility have been suggested. One way is to posit necessary conditions for one's being mentally ill in the manner proposed by Flew. But this was rejected as rather
arbitrary."4 One way, accepted here, is to argue that the term 'mental
illness' ought not to be -applied (even if it could be) to certain disfavored
behavior, because it causes more harm than good. Another way would
be for the state to cease criminalizing or otherwise discriminating against
socially disapproved behavior which does not harm others, so that whether
or not someone manifests mental illness by virtue of such behavior becomes irrelevant in the public sphere. Another way is to make people
aware that the term 'mental illness' can be used so extensively that any
conduct which has an adverse effect on the development of the person as
a mature being would manifest mental illness. Under this use those who
overeat, smoke, drink heavily, fail to exercise or eat high cholesterol foods
such as beef or ice cream could be labeled mentally ill because 'they are
acting contrary to the rational goal of life maximization. Once it is recognized that the term 'mental illness' can be used as a handy weapon by
anyone against anyone, then everyone has reason to fear that the term
43. L. WITGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS
transl. 1953).

§ 66-67 (G. Anscombe

44. It can be argued that the reviewer, as well as Flew, posits an arbitrary condition for the existence of mental illness in that he suggests that from an everyday
understanding a person manifests mental illness when his conduct is irrationally related to any understandable non-self-destructive wants or goals.

But the appropriate

response to this argument is that the reviewer is suggesting a sufficient condition for
one use (an everyday understanding) of 'mental illness' whereas Flew is positing
necessary conditions generally for the proper use of 'mental illness.' There seems

to be no arbitrariness in the reviewer's suggestion.
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could be used against him. Presumably, this would make people pause
before using this term as a weapon to attack and sometimes criminalize
what they dislike and fear.
Another possible way of dealing with the anti-humane use of the term
'mental illness' is for those so characterized not to regard it as a pejorative term. Who among us could claim reasonably the label 'totally sane'?
An even casual examination of contemporary events leads to the unhappy
but easy conclusion that totally sane individuals are in short supply. If
this is not so, and the world really can be characterized adequately as
sane, then it is not unreasonable to prefer to be regarded as mentally ill.
As T.S. Eliot once put it (in the words of Celia, a character visiting her
psychiatrist in The Cocktail Party):
... I should really like to think there's something wrong with meBecause, if there isn't, then there's something wrong,
Or at least, very different from what it seems to be,
With the world itself-and that's much more frightening!
That would be terrible. So I'd rather believe
45
There is something wrong with me, that could be put right.

45.

T.S. ELIOT, THF, COCKTAIL PARTY 132 (1958).

